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This set of  teaching cases deals with the surprising acquisition of VOIP provider Skype SA by e-commerce giant 
eBay in the fall of 2005. The initial case examines two distinct topics: First, it introduces VOIP technology and traces 
the development of commercial applications from 1995 to 2003. Second, it considers issues of strategic alignment 
by raising the question of whether eBay should have allied with or acquired Skype SA. The second case provides an 
epilogue set two years after the acquisition that examines the intermediate outcomes of the Skype integration. 
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PART A 
[In 2003] I went to one of the large carriers and I told them, ‘You won’t believe the explosion of PC-
to-PC calling we’re seeing at SIPphone.’ He said, ‘You know, geeks might talk to each other on 
PCs, but I don’t see normal people using their PCs to make calls.’ And I was struck by a very similar 
conversation I had about seven years ago with the record labels when I said, ‘You won’t believe 
what’s happening, people are listening to music on their computers.’ And I remember them saying, 
‘Well, we don’t think the average person is going to listen to music on a computer.’ And you tried to 
explain to them, ‘Well, look, you can do so much more with a computer—you can organize your 
music and make playlists and burn CDs.’ They couldn’t get it.  
Michael Roberson, CEO of SIPphone [Rojas 2005]  
I. INTRODUCTION 1, 2 
The early fall of 2005 was full of speculation about the future of the major Internet players Google, Yahoo, and eBay. 
In the constant struggle to gain market share and to extend their user bases, the three companies were looking to 
Internet communication service provision as a potential target for market extension. Yahoo started the reign of deals 
when it acquired Dialpad, a Voice-over-Internet Protocol (VOIP) communications provider, and its user base of 14 
million in June 2005 for an undisclosed amount. Google soon reacted by releasing its own VOIP service, Google 
Talk, in late August. 
 
While it was expected that the two leading Internet portals would make a move toward acquiring VOIP capabilities, it 
came as a surprise when eBay, the world’s leading online marketplace, announced plans to purchase Skype SA, a 
European VOIP provider in September 2005. The deal, potentially worth more than USD 4 billion, was rationalized 
with synergies between eBay’s business lines and as an acquisition of a user growth engine. Although eBay had 
been successful in the past with integrating of new businesses such as PayPal, many outside observers had doubts 
whether the acquisition of an unrelated business was a wise business decision:  
 
Had eBay overpaid for potential synergies amid the market pressures for a service that it could easily have leased or 
was it positioning itself to become a major player in a USD 2 trillion telecommunications industry?  
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF VOIP AND THE IP TELEPHONY MARKET 
Internet Protocol telephony (IP telephony), or voice over IP (VOIP), referred to voice calls that were transmitted over 
an IP network such as the Internet, rather than over the familiar circuit switched telephone network (PSTN). In a 
PSTN, telephone calls were routed based on a destination number and the geographical location of the called user. 
Thus, in a circuit switched network, first a connection was established before a call can begin. The topology of the 
telephone operator owned network dictated how calls were routed.  
 
In the IP process, data were packetized, sent to a specific IP address and then reassembled at the destination. 
Packets were routed and rerouted through network hosts without a predetermined route until they arrived at the 
destination. Thus, no given package had to take the same route or to use the same network as the other associated 
packets. As such, IP-based communication did not require a proprietary infrastructure. However, since IP was a 
connectionless protocol, data corruption, out-of-order delivery of the packets or lost packets were common 
occurrences. While those effects could be mitigated through transmission of redundant packets, it provided 
challenges for the time critical delivery of voice data. 
 
IP telephony evolved parallel to the Internet. In the late 1970s, experiments to transmit voice over ARPANET, the 
predecessor of the Internet, were undertaken. While these experiments demonstrated the capabilities of IP 
telephony, only some of the few individuals with access to ARPANET used these applications. The end user 
                                                     
1 The authors have prepared this case as the basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an 
administrative situation. It is not intended that statements herein be excerpted as fact outside of the class discussion. 
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adoption of the WWW, fueled by the availability of the Netscape browser in 1995, led to the development of 
commercial VOIP applications. 
Early Commercialization 
Released in March 1995, VocalTec’s InternetPhone was one of the first VOIP software applications available to the 
public. Priced at USD 49.99 for two licenses, the software allowed free PC-to-PC calls between users who had 
installed the software client. The application included features such as a user-friendly interface, chat capabilities, 
collaboration tools such as white boards, and a directory of users online [Keating 1996]. 
 
While the client was quite sophisticated for its time, there were several technical hurdles that prevented mainstream 
adoption of the InternetPhone application and IP telephony in general. First, VOIP required high bandwidth to 
achieve satisfactory sound quality. At the time, most end users connected to their Internet Service provider via 14.4 
or 28.8 Kbit modems. The most common approach to counter the bandwidth restrictions was to compress the 
packets. However, the early compression standards required processing power that most PCs could not provide at 
the time. Moreover, the lack of standard interfaces for auxiliary devices such as soundcards, more often than not led 
to compatibility issues. 
 
The result of these early hurdles was a subpar user experience. The lack of bandwidth and processing power led to 
delays in the transmission and lost packages. Most of the time, only one user could speak; pauses during the 
conversation were the norm. However, despite the low quality of service, certain applications, such as overseas 
calling led to adoption. One early adopter summarized his IP telephony experience in 1996: 
 
VocalTech (Internet Phone) and maybe half a dozen other outfits are offering phone-like service 
over the Internet. Right now it's a bit like ham radio. But it's very intelligible and very usable as a 
social medium and even for business. Which am I going to opt for—the kind of quality that lets me 
hear a pin fall in the background for about $100 an hour to talk to someone in Europe, or just 
enough quality at no charge beyond what I pay my Internet access carrier (about 30 cents an hour). 
[Seltzer 1996] 
In the fall of 1996, a major step toward improving the quality of IP communications was undertaken. At that time, the 
ITU-I, the telecommunications standardization sector sanctioned by the United Nations, approved the H.323 
standard as the international standard for multimedia communications over packet-based networks. The standard 
adoption had three major outcomes. First, it minimized hardware configuration issues that had slowed adoption of 
VOIP services in the past. Second, the unified standard allowed connections between the formerly separate 
software clients, increasing the network of users that could call each other. Third, and most importantly, H.323 also 
provided a gateway to the PSTN network, allowing for PC to landline calls. 
 
Net2Phone was one of the first companies to take advantage of the new standard. In 1997, it added PC-to-Phone 
services to its existing PC-to PC service. By 1999, Net2Phone was the clear market leader in the VOIP market, 
claiming 1.5 million registered users. Despite being unprofitable at the time, the company received investments by 
Softbank and AOL. The initial public offering in July raised USD 80 million for 12 percent of its shares followed by 
the sale of an equal share for USD 384 million just five months later. Despite its success with the capital markets, 
Net2Phone never managed to live up to its promises. 2003 was the first profitable year for Net2Phone. By then the 
market capitalization had dropped to less than 5 percent of its initial value [2004]. 
 
Several factors led to the demise of Net2Phone. From a market perspective, the Internet bubble had burst and 
investors were shying away from unprofitable companies. More importantly, users never switched to making VOIP 
calls, despite the potential cost savings. From a user perspective, calling from the PC was still inconvenient. Starting 
up the PC, plugging in the microphone and dealing with an unaccustomed user interface, did not lend itself to 
making a quick phone call [Wong 2003]. Moreover, broadband Internet, a major factor in VOIP quality, was only 
starting to be adopted in U.S. households. 
 
By 2003, the VOIP market in the U.S. was highly segmented. There were numerous niche providers of PC-to-PC 
services that allowed their users to call each other. Also, MSN and Yahoo had equipped their Instant Messengers 
with voice capabilities. However, there was still a lack of interoperability between networks, leading to the 
inconvenience of having to use multiple clients to reach various contacts. In the PC-to-Phone segment, Vonage had 
become the new market leader. The Vonage service was marketed as a landline replacement, by offering hardware 
that would work independently of a software client and that could utilize existing telephones. However, pricing similar 
to existing PSTN contracts and the varying call quality only led to modest adoption. By 2003, only 150,000 paying 
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Skype SA  
Skype SA was the brainchild and second startup of Niklas Zennström and Janus Friis. Rather than focusing on a 
specific market, they focused on the possibilities of peer-to-peer (P2P) technology. In 2004, Zennström recollected: 
“When Janus and I started [...] our vision was that peer-to-peer technology was kind of a fundamental technology 
that could be used for a whole lot of different business areas [Oakes 2004].” 
 
Their first venture was Kazaa. After the legally induced demise of Napster for providing a centralized database that 
listed the locations of copyrighted files, Kazaa soon became the peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing network of choice. It 
gained popularity since it was completely decentralized and outside the reach of U.S. authorities, being 
headquartered in the Netherlands. Much like Napster, it enabled its users to search, share, and trade digital assets 
such as documents, music, and movies. By the fall of 2001, Kazaa had more than 5 million users.  
 
Kazaa did not earn money from the actual trades but by bundling its client software with Adware and Spyware such 
as Cydoor or Webhancer [Cave 2001]. Yet the music industry argued that Kazaa indirectly profited from the 
infringement committed by its users and sued Kazaa. Under tremendous legal pressure and with costs mounting, 
Zennström and Friis knew they had to move on. In January 2002 the pair sold Kazaa for $500,000 to Sharman 
Networks, a company incorporated in Vanuatu in the South Pacific. "To make it work, we would have had to be very 
savvy about the music business, and that was not our strength," says Zennström. "So we thought, 'Let's try the next 
incarnation of this' [Foroohar and McGinn 2005]." The lessons from the Kazaa experience were clear: To turn their 
deep knowledge of P2P technology into a commercially successful venture, they needed to have a clear-cut revenue 
model that would steer clear of legal trouble. 
 
In the summer of 2002, the two decided to tackle the USD 1 billion communications industry. They formed the 
ambitious goal of providing a free and easy-to-use application that would enable users to have free telephone 
conversations over the Internet, eventually replacing landline phones. Being backed by small venture capital 
investments and supported by the same programming group that aided them to create Kazaa, they started their new 
venture in a small office in Luxembourg.  
 
Within a year, the first beta version of their software was launched, enabling PC-to-PC telephony. Radically different 
from the traditional telecommunication companies, Skype incurred hardly any infrastructure-related fixed costs. By 
using VOIP, they utilized the free Internet infrastructure, and by deploying P2P distribution, they used the idle 
computing resources of their users rather than their own expensive servers.  
 
The first beta version was launched in 2003, enabling only PC-to-PC telephony. Less than two months after the 
release of the first beta version, more than 1.5 million users had downloaded the Skype application. Within a year, 
this number had risen by over 100 million with more than 1.2 billion PC-to-PC voice minutes served. More 
importantly, in July 2004, Skype finally started to generate revenue by introducing the paid-for PC-to-Phone service 
branded SkypeOut. Priced between USD .02 per minute, for calls to landlines in mature telecommunication markets, 
to USD 1.46 per minute to calls to East Timor, more than 2 million SkypeOut calls were undertaken in the first month 
alone [Zennström 2006].3 By March 2005, more than 1 million customers had purchased and used SkypeOut. In 
June 2005, Skype added two more premium services: SkypeIn (a virtual local number that enables landline users to 
call the Skype user) and Voicemail. The second anniversary of the initial product launch revealed staggering 
numbers [2005b]:  
 
- More than 150 million downloads in 225 countries and territories 
- More than 51 million people registered users (150,000 new users per day) 
- More than 12 billion minutes served (equating to more than 45 percent of all U.S. VOIP traffic) 
- More than 2 million people created accounts for Skype’s paid services 
Besides its core business, Skype also developed a vast network of thousands of partners and developers building 
hardware and software products, as well services around the Skype experience. 
 
At the time of the acquisition Skype was still an unprofitable business. Revenue had increased from an estimated 
USD 7 million in the first year to nearly USD 60 million in the fiscal year of 2005. Gross margin was estimated at 
about 18 percent of the revenues, mainly due to the high cost of the landline connection fees [Blodget 2007a]. 
However, Skype had managed to develop a successful product and become the VOIP market leader in the course 
                                                     
3 Please refer to Table 4 in the Appendix for a list of sample SkypeOut prices 
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of two years, using only USD 35 million in venture capital. It did not take long for the traditional telecommunication 
companies and other interested players to notice this exponential growth fueled by viral marketing of a great service. 
III. EBAY INC 
Founded in 1995, eBay Inc. had become a global powerhouse of online marketplaces, acting as a broker to facilitate 
transactions between buyers and sellers across a wide range of goods and services. What began as an auction site 
for collectibles had developed into a wide spectrum of possibilities across virtually every product category 
imaginable. 
 
In 2005, the two pillars of eBay’s business were the eBay marketplace and the PayPal payments unit. The eBay 
management described its role in the marketplace as that of a “trading platform”: 
 
[eBay] marketplace exists as an online trading platform that enables a global community of buyers 
and sellers to interact and trade with one another. Our role is to create, maintain, and expand the 
functionality, safety, ease-of-use, and reliability of our trading platform while, at the same time, 
supporting the growth and success of our community of users. [eBay Inc. 2005] 
The eBay platform included software tools and services that allowed buyers and sellers to trade with one another 
more easily and more efficiently. Software tools and services helped automating the selling process and aided in the 
shipment process. Moreover, PayPal facilitated the online exchange of funds and provides fraud protection.  
 
Table 1. eBay Inc: Net Transaction Revenues by Type (in USD 000) 
 2002 2003 2004 
 U.S. Marketplace  718,239 1,024,915 1,338,715  
 International Marketplace  297,485 657,874 1,157,472  
 Payments (PayPal) 93,303 429,453 680,813  
 Total net transaction revenues  1,109,027 2,112,242 3,177,000  
 Advertising and other revenues  105,073 52,854 94,309  
 Total net revenues  1,214,100 2,165,096 3,271,309  
 
Aside from internal improvements driven by its vast community, eBay relied on external partnerships and 
acquisitions both to improve the transaction experience and to increase its share of transaction fees. Services such 
as the global payments platform, trust and safety programs, user verification, buyer protection and assurance 
programs, postage and other shipping services, vehicle inspections, escrow, and authentication and appraisal 
services were intended to create a faster, easier, and safer trading environment. 
Business Model and Investment Strategy 
Meg Whitman, the CEO of eBay Inc. at the time of the acquisition, had long held the notion that eBay’s core 
competence was the connection of buyers and sellers [2006]. The marketplace initially connected parties in an 
auction format for used or overstocked items. With eBay Express, sellers and buyers of new items were connected. 
In the same vein, PayPal provided a platform where parties can facilitate transactions, regardless of their actual 
bank accounts or preferred currency. 
 
PayPal, acquired in 2002 for USD 1.5 billion, was both the most expensive and most influential of eBay’s 
investments. At the time of purchase in July 2002, PayPal account holders numbered 16 million, with 295,000 
payment transactions taking place every day. Moreover, an estimated 25-to-40 percent of transactions taking place 
on eBay were settled through PayPal [Kane 2002]. By the end of 2004, PayPal had become an integral eBay 
business model, contributing nearly 20 percent of total net revenue and posting more than one-third of its 64 million 
accounts as active.  
 
Although the eBay marketplace was the preeminent auction site on the Web, eBay had extended its business model 
beyond market matching and transaction facilitation. By 2005, eBay had also made numerous investments in the 
sales-lead business, such its 25 percent ownership of craigslist.com (a free classified site), the acquisition of 
Shopping.com (price comparison portal), and Rent.com. While the eBay portfolio seems diversified, all investments 
were targeted to either create sales leads prior to a transaction (shopping.com) or to remove friction from the 
transaction (PayPal), which aimed to strengthen the core business of the marketplace by increasing the volume of 
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While those investments showed promise to grow eBay in the long run, it also became clear that eBay needed to 
find more innovative and disruptive technology to continue the streak of growing net revenue at nearly 50 percent 
annually. 
IV. THE ACQUISITION OF SKYPE 
In 2005, the VOIP industry became the target of heavy private investment and takeover speculation. Fueled by the 
market penetration of broadband Internet, Vonage Inc. had surpassed the 1 million subscriber mark by early 
September and had secured more than USD 600 million in private funding. Yahoo Inc. also invested in the VOIP 
business, buying Dialpad and its 14 million customer base for an undisclosed amount. Moreover, Google refrained 
from buying an external provider, instead introducing GoogleTalk in late August. 
 
Skype SA was rumored to be a target for all the aforementioned companies [Kewney 2005]. The potential suitors 
viewed acquisition of Skype SA as a preventative move which would certainly hurt the companies that failed to buy 
the VOIP market leader. However, Zennström did not simply want to sell Skype and see the company dismantled by 
its suitor. He favored a solution where Skype would be acquired but could still operate as a stand-alone company: 
 
You've seen it so many times when technology companies are acquiring small companies and one 
year after you don't see those companies anymore because they got completely dismantled. This 
happens like when Cisco, or Microsoft or some other company is acquiring companies. We said 
Skype needed to be a separate company so that you can still foster the growth and the innovation of 
the company but we should take advantage of synergies when we have them. [Steinberg 2006] 
When eBay approached Skype SA, Zennström saw the chance to fulfill his vision, drawing parallels to PayPal. 
PayPal had developed into the premier payment-processing provider by utilizing both the eBay marketplace 
transactions and developing its merchant services for independent e-commerce merchants. Thus, PayPal had the 
best of both worlds: It leveraged eBay’s platform to grow its network, which in turn made it more attractive for 
merchants to adopt PayPal payment processing. 
 
EBay’s management also was intrigued by the striking similarities. Just like eBay and PayPal in their early days, 
Skype posted tremendous growth numbers fueled by viral marketing and the concurrent network effect. Moreover, 
Skype was already the market leader in VOIP communication service provisions, and its paid services were just 
starting to take off. Thus, the business would be able to sustain itself without further subsidies. In addition to being a 
successful stand-alone business, eBay could also foresee vital synergies if the acquisition occurred. Skype could 
augment eBay in two dimensions: volume and network effects across the subsidiaries. 
 
Two key areas were expected to increase eBay’s transaction volume: the increased user base and the 
establishment of lucrative high-priced auctions. Skype had a user base that was strikingly complementary. With 84 
percent of Skype users registered outside the U.S. and, according to Nielsen NetRatings, with an only 1 percent 
overlap of eBay U.S. and Skype users, there was a ready-made customer network of 50 million potential eBay users 
that was growing by 150,000 every day. Besides the European contingent, Skype users were mainly located in fast-
growing economies such as India, China, and Russia where eBay or any other online marketplace had yet to 
become a dominant force. Through Skype, the penetration in those markets could be accelerated. In addition, eBay 
also envisioned that live or open-cry auctions would be enabled through the Skype voice and one-to-many video 
conferencing technology. In the same vein, it was anticipated that high price and communication intensive 
categories such as art and antiques would increase.  
 
Second, Skype’s integration was anticipated to foster cross-marketing among the different eBay brands. The 
management envisioned that Skype could be integrated into eBay auctions to facilitate more intimate 
communications. Moreover, with PayPal already accounting for roughly 20 percent of Skype’s transaction 
processing, a money-wire per call or integrated paid-call service model was easy to conceive. Lastly, the Skype 
integration also was seen as vital to strengthening the sales-lead and classified business. 
 
eBay proceeded with the acquisition process by offering a two tiered deal that was accepted by the Skype SA 
shareholders in October 2007. The first part of the offer included an immediate purchase price of USD 2.6 billion, 
payable in eBay stocks. In addition, a performance based earn-out was negotiated. If Skype would achieve 
undisclosed performance metrics over the next four years, the Skype owners could receive an additional USD 1.7 
billion. Moreover, key Skype personnel had to commit to work for the newly formed eBay subsidiary for the next few 
years. 
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Communications is at the heart of e-commerce and community. By combining the two leading e-
commerce franchises, eBay and PayPal, with the leader in Internet voice communications, we will 
create an extraordinarily powerful environment for business on the Net [Neilan and Belson 2005]. 
[which will deliver] unparalleled e-commerce and communications engine [by] removing a key point 
of friction between buyers and sellers. [Broache 2005] 
While Whitman’s predictions were enthusiastic, the market voiced a more skeptical opinion. 
Reactions to the Acquisition 
The reactions to the acquisitions were mixed at best. In the week after the announcement, eBay shares fell nearly 4 
percent [2005a]. Besides the heavy price tag of USD 2.6 billion (plus a potential USD 1.7 billion in performance 
earn-outs), the distancing from the core business was the main concern voiced by analysts and industry experts.  
Industry observers were quick to observe that most of the previous investments were led by the needs and feedback 
of the users [Hof 2005]. One reason to purchase PayPal, despite the previous USD 100 million investment in 
BidPay, was its user acceptance. Powersellers voiced their concern that Skype neither added to existing capabilities 
nor would change the way they conduct business on eBay [Berr 2005]. John Hagel went as far as questioning 
eBay’s core business by proclaiming that Skype was just another high-multiple purchase that would divert from the 
marketplace’s slowing growth and saturation, resembling purchases undertaken at the height of the Internet bubble. 
He further doubted whether a partnership would have been a cheaper and more reasonable alternative to the 
acquisition [Hagel 2005].  
 
While the synergy and network effects were generally dismissed, support of the acquisition persisted. Martin 
Geddes, a telecommunications analyst, noted that it was simply an attack at another industry that generated huge 
revenues while lacking to innovate: 
 
 Just like PayPal was a business model that disrupted the banking industry, the acquisition of Skype 
is eBay’s attempt to take its slice out of the telecommunications companies’ revenues using an 
innovative technology. [Geddes 2005]  
V. QUESTIONS 
1. How have the IP telephony market and the service offerings changed in the last 10 years? 
2. Why should eBay buy Skype when it can lease it? 
3. Why would eBay pay so much (USD 2.6 billion plus a potential USD 1.7 billon earn-out)?  
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PART B:  
Skype has been an incredible adventure and I am proud to have been part of it. Looking back at 
2003, at two guys running around with a crazy idea of building a global phone company purely on 
the Internet, moving from one rented apartment to another, still battling a major lawsuit from our 
Kazaa days, 2003 seems a long time ago. It is amazing to think that it is only four years!  
Janus Friis – Co-Founder of Skype SA, October 1, 2007 
I. INTRODUCTION 
October 2007 marked both the fourth anniversary of the release of Skype’s first public beta and the second 
anniversary of eBay’s acquisition of Skype SA. It also was a month of change and reassessment of the progress of 
the Skype integrations as the third pillar of eBay’s business model.  
 
The month started out with the announcement that co-founder Niklas Zennström would leave eBay to focus on his 
newest startup, Joost, and his venture capital company, Atomico. On the same day, eBay also announced that the 
Skype shareholders would receive USD 530 million in earn-outs, which was roughly one-third of the maximum 
payout of USD 1.7 billon that was negotiated during the Skype acquisition two years earlier.  
 
Later that month, eBay also reported its third-quarter earnings, which showed growth in Skype’s revenue and user 
base as well as profitability for the third straight quarter. The month was capped with announcements of Skype’s 
final integration into all categories of the eBay marketplace, an integration of Skype into MySpace, and an 
integration of Facebook content into the Skype client. Yet, despite the growing success of Skype, eBay also 
announced a goodwill write-off of USD 900 million, which decreased Skype’s book value to USD 2.2 billion and led 
to eBay posting the first unprofitable quarter in more than eight years. 
 
Were the pessimistic predictions that many industry observers voiced two years earlier coming true? 
II. ZENNSTRÖM RESIGNS AS CEO OF SKYPE 
As with most serial entrepreneurs, it was expected that Zennström would leave eBay at some point in time. While 
the original earn-out period was scheduled for four years, Zennström had more interest in pursuing his newest 
venture. He envisioned changing TV distribution the same way Skype had changed the telecommunications 
industry. Thus, IPTV became the new focus. Simply put, leveraging the P2P distribution to provide Internet 
Television on steroids. The name of the fledgling company was appropriate: Joost (pronounced “juiced”). 
 
In fact, the announcement of his departure coincided with the public release of the Joost Beta version. While most of 
the industry observers equated the smaller earn-out as a sign of Skype failing to meet its growth and revenue 
expectations, it was nothing short of remarkable to have sold a company for more than USD 3.2 billion after only four 
years of market presence. Co-founder Janus Friis put the “failure” in perspective:  
 
Earn-outs are inherently difficult creatures, but we are happy with the result of this one. We are 
approximately half way into the earn-out period and the settlement amounts to one-third of the total 
possible earn-out amount. [Friis 2007b] 
Despite the fact that the lofty expectations toward Skype’s performance were not met, the growth in revenue and 
user base was still remarkable. Since its acquisition two years earlier, Skype had nearly quintupled its registered 
user base to over 240 million. Also, revenue for the fiscal year of 2007 was expected to exceed USD 400 million, 
which was an increase of more than 650 percent compared to the year of the acquisition [Schonfeld 2007]. In 
addition, Skype had managed to become profitable for every quarter in 2007 [eBay Inc. 2007]. The eBay 
management was quick to add that Zennström move to the position of non-executive chairman of Skype would not 
change the long-term strategy of the subsidiary [Musich 2007]. 
III. GROWING SKYPE AS A STAND-ALONE BUSINESS 
In its two years as an eBay subsidiary, Skype management had focused key drivers for growing its user base: 
further accelerating the viral adoption of the client and continuously releasing new software clients to adapt to the 
users’ evolving needs. 
Accelerating the Viral Growth 
On a global scale, Skype continued the exponential growth of its user base. Since the acquisition, the number of 
registered users increased from 50 million to nearly 250 million. The growth was mainly attributed to the viral power 
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of Skype. Yet, on a regional basis, Skype adoption varied. While Europe and Asia posted strong growth rates, the 
U.S. was lagging behind. To increase the popularity of Skype in North America, the company offered free SkypeOut 
calls within the U.S. and Canada from spring 2006 until the end of the year. Yet, as SkypeOut minutes increased by 
40 percent over that time span, the revenue share of U.S. users did not rise during the promotional period or in the 
first three quarters of 2007. 
Enhancing the Software Client 
The second driver of user growth involved introducing new features and fostering innovation of complementary 
hardware accessories. With Version 2.0, released in December 2005, Skype introduced video conferencing. Initially 
only employed for one-to-one calls, the feature evolved, creating the new capacity for one-to-many SkypeCasts. In 
May 2006, Skype 2.5 enhanced this feature enabling many-to-many video calls, thus evolving into a cheap 
alternative for global videoconferences. This version also incorporated SMS for as little as USD .01 as an attempt to 
tap into the USD 40 billon text messaging market [2008a]. Skype 2.5 also introduced better usability features such 
as the automated import of email contacts and categorization of contacts into groups.  
 
Staying on pace to release an overhauled version every six months, the Beta version of 3.0 became available in 
November 2006. Most of the features, such as personalization of the client and design overhauls, were usability-
oriented. To further foster SkypeOut calls, 3.0 also included browser integration by offering its “click to call feature,” 
which recognized phone numbers displayed on Web pages, automatically converting them into a direct link that 
would launch a SkypeOut call upon a click. The latest version was geared towards features that would mimic 
modern telephone systems. Version 3.5 included features such as call transfer, automatic redial, and the integration 
into MS Outlook, all clearly targeted at business users.  
Setbacks of Growth and Continuous Innovation 
The growing popularity also had negative effects. In September 2007, a software worm spread quickly through the 
Skype network, raising Skype-related security concerns and causing many systems administrators to temporality 
block Skype traffic. While the worm did not cause any harm, it was a reminder that Skype had to address security to 
cater to business clients. This was particularly important after a Skype service outage a month earlier caused severe 
criticism of how the situation was handled and raised the question of whether Skype really was a reliable landline 
replacement [Blodget 2007b].  
 
Despite the setbacks, the new features were embraced by the user community. On average, half a million clients 
were downloaded every day, amounting to more than 700 million total downloads of the different Skype clients by 
the end of October 2007. At the same time, Skype also was able to eclipse the mark of 10 million concurrent users, 
increasing by tenfold the 1 million concurrent users it had only three years earlier [Mercier 2007].  
 
An eBay spokesperson summarized Skype’s performance: “We feel like we can do a lot more with Skype as a 
stand-alone VoIP provider. Skype has been focused on user acquisition and it's done a great job. But we also feel 
like we can find new ways to monetize those users” [Reardon 2007]. 
IV. GROWING THE REVENUE 
Soon after the 2006 promotional period of free SkypeOut calls in North America ended, Skype introduced a new 
pricing structure and features to grow the VOIP revenue per user. In January 2007, Skype changed the SkypeOut 
pricing structure by adding a connection fee of USD .045 for every call placed. At the same time, it also offered 
SkypePro, which included a lower per-call fee and discounted fees on features such as SkypeIn and voicemail, but 
required a monthly subscription fee of USD 3. There were a few outcries about the changing pricing structure, but 
despite the expected drop-off from users who only used SkypeOut while it was free, paid voice minutes grew 
proportionally to the number of users added [Friis 2007a]. However, in fall 2007, evidence emerged showing that the 
usage of SkypeOut was declining. Despite the continuous growth of the user base, the total number of SkypeOut 
minutes had stagnated at 1.4 billons in each quarter in 2007. One industry analyst noted that” Skype's core business 
isn't much different from a really cheap calling card business. The margins are really thin” [Reardon 2007].4 
 
To diversify revenue streams, Skype introduced other telephony services and pricing packages. SkypeUnlimited was 
offered as a flat rate for in-country calls for a monthly flat fee of USD 3. SkypeFind, a directory listing service, was 
introduced as a platform for premium calls that were usually associated with 0900 numbers. SkypePrime enabled 
service providers to set their own price for offerings such as consulting that could be conducted via the Skype client. 
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In addition to internal developments, Skype actively promoted third-party services and products in an effort to further 
increase the paid voice and licensing revenues.  
 
From a financial perspective, Skype slowly picked up steam. The first three quarters of 2007 were all profitable. The 
revenue had steadily grown and was expected to be close to USD 400 million in the 2007 fiscal year. However, 
there were also signs that the monetization per user did not seem to increase. On average, every registered user 
had only generated approximately USD .40 per quarter since 2006. Also, not only did the volume of paid SkypeOut 
minutes stay flat in 2007, the actual number of free Skype-to-Skype minutes actually declined, raising concerns that 
after the initial hype, more and more power users were switching to competitive services. (See Table 2 in the 
appendix for selected financial and usage data.) 
Integration Efforts 
Synergies with the other eBay business lines were the main justification for the acquisition of Skype. The effort was 
dubbed “The Power of Three,” indicating that three stand-alone growth businesses could be even more successful if 
they were integrated across the three businesses. The first integration took place between Skype and Paypal. 
Touted as a VOIP-enabled “Western Union,” Skype’s version 2.5, released in May 2006, was expected to include 
functionalities to send and receive payments from contacts with a click of a button. Yet, the feature did not appear 
until March 2007, raising questions as to why the integration of the already preferred payment provider was taking 
so long. 
 
The same criticism was voiced over the integration of Skype into the eBay marketplace. Although the Dutch eBay 
subsidiary marktplaats.nl started a pilot integration in October 2005, eBay was slow to introduce Skype on a global 
scale [2005c]. After pilots in other European countries, the SkypeMe button, allowing instant calls to the sellers, was 
first rolled out in selected U.S. categories in June 2006. EBay justified its slow roll out as an adoption experiment 
citing that it did not want to confuse its sellers with unfamiliar features. Yet the resistance of sellers to use voice 
features in general seemed also to have played an important role in the decision [Hof 2006]. In fall 2007, Skype 
finally was integrated into all eBay categories. In the process, eBay also banned all other voice services from its site, 
stating that only eBay-owned Skype could be used to facilitate marketplace-related voice communication [Steiner 
2007]. 
 
It was unclear what the results of the delayed integration would be. But it was apparent that eBay was dissatisfied 
with the slow progress and lack of monetization of synergies. As a result, Ebay took a goodwill write-down and 
reduced the book value of Skype to USD 2.2 billion. In an effort to revamp the efforts to grow the synergies, most of 
the Skype management was replaced alongside Niklas’ departure [Associated Press 2007]. While internal synergies 
had yet to materialize, partnerships with third-party providers were starting to flourish. 
Third-Party Applications and Accessories 
On the accessory side, innovations received an enormous amount of publicity. The announcements of the release of 
WIFI-enabled phones by Netgear and Keyspad were among the biggest Skype-related news items of 2006 [2007]. 
3G/ WIFI hybrid Amobi Phone in Europe was an instant sellout. Priced at 100 USD, the phone enabled customers of 
Hutchinson’s subsidiary 3 UK to take advantage of modest Skype pricing while being within the coverage of a WIFI 
hotspot. Besides the revenue from the SkypeOut calls, Skype also was expected to receive a share of the regular 
phone usage and licensing fees.  
 
Moreover, a large-scale roll out of Skype-branded accessories at Wal-Mart was announced in the summer of 2007. 
While specifics of the deal were not disclosed, it was estimated that Skype commanded a licensing fee of 5 percent 
of the wholesale price for Skype-branded or Skype-certified hardware products. In addition, prepaid calling cards 
allowing unlimited PC to landline calls in the North America for USD 8.85 were offered. While the financial gains had 
yet to materialize, it was assumed that the exposure to Wal-Mart’s large distribution network would open up new 
customer segments that would use Skype’s paid services rather than just the free services offered by Skype. 
 
Aside from the efforts to increase the monetization of its users, Skype also pushed to expand its range of services. 
Originally developed as a closed application with a proprietary protocol, the Skype client soon evolved into a 
programming platform. In 2005, the Skype Developer Zone opened to the public, allowing programmers to develop 
applications and features by themselves. Available documentation and frequent developer competitions attracted a 
wealth of volunteer developers. In the three years of its existence, the “Skype sandbox” had much to show. More 
than 4,000 developers participated, creating more than 350 Skype-enabled applications [Willis 2007]. 
 
In fall 2007, Skype announced collaborations with the popular social networking sites Facebook and MySpace. On 
one hand, Skype integrated popular Facebook games into its clients, giving users the chance to play with their 
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friends while using Skype. Skype also started to develop games of its own, which it then planned to publish via 
Facebook. Facebook games had become a hot trend, with users challenging their friends on a daily basis. Skype 
wanted to leverage that phenomenon for two reasons: to raise the awareness of Skype by displaying its brand name 
within the games and to put an application launcher onto the Facebook profile of each user that had added the game 
[Dolcourt 2007]. 
 
The MySpace announcement was less subtle. On October 16, 2007, Skype became the official voice provider for 
the network of 110 million MySpace members. Skype was to be incorporated into the MySpace Instant Messaging 
client, enabling MySpace users to place free Skype calls to their friends and eventually adopt Skype as their VOIP 
client of choice for paid services, as well [AFP 2007].  
 
Both efforts were deemed as another attempt to leverage viral effects in social networks and to introduce Skype to a 
younger and predominantly North American audience. However, given the track record of Skype’s integration into 
the eBay marketplace, it seemed doubtful that the announced partnerships would materialize any time soon. 
V. LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE 
Skype had gone through a tremendous development in growing its user base, but two years after the acquisition it 
was challenged to monetize that growth. Several industry observers suggested that Skype’s future was in the mobile 
business, where it could offer competitive rates while earning revenues by licensing its brand name to OEM 
manufacturers.  
 
In the Internet arena, Skype was facing a VOIP market with continuously eroding margins spurred by new 
competitive offerings nearly every week. Aside from the established players like Yahoo! Voice, GoogleTalk, and 
Microsoft’s LiveMessenger, upstarts like JahJah and QQ, along with more than 150 VOIP providers, were fighting to 
lure customers [2008b; Uberti 2007]. With a user base of 250 million, Skype was confident that the client would soon 
be synonymous with VOIP communication, evolving into a de facto standard. However, the lack of interoperability 
with the other networks was a concern for industry observers. 
 
Another question was whether Skype could capitalize on the growing advertising business. While eBay initially only 
foresaw integration of its own businesses, there didn’t seem to be a good reason why ads should not be served 
through the client. Yet, it appeared that eBay lacked the capabilities to place context-related ads and was reluctant 
to partner with competitors Google or Yahoo! to make this business line a success.  
 
As for the integration with the other eBay businesses, the predictions were not really clear. EBay’s recent foray into 
social commerce by creating more social network communities around specific categories did not seem to directly 
involve the Skype application. But then again, maybe lowering expectations might be a good strategy this time 
around…  
VI. QUESTIONS 
1. Evaluate the performance of Skype since the acquisition. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 2. Selected Performance and Usage Data of eBay's Communications Subsidiary Skype 
  05-Q4 06-Q1 06-Q2 06-Q3 06-Q4 07-Q1 07-Q2 07-Q3
Revenues (USD million) 25 35 44 50 66 79 90 97 
(delta millions)   10 9 6 16 13 11 7 
(Q/Q)   40% 26% 14% 32% 20% 14% 8% 
(Y/Y)           126% 105% 94% 
Intl revenue 87% 87% 86% 84% 84% 85% 84% 83% 
Estimated US revenue 3.25 4.55 6.16 8 10.56 11.85 14.4 16.49 
         
Direct Contribution (USD million) -1 -9 -8 -10 -1 3 9 14 
         
User Accounts (million) 75 95 113 136 171 196 220 245.7 
(delta millions)   20 18 23 35 25 24 25.7 
(Q/Q)   27% 19% 20% 26% 15% 12% 12% 
(Y/Y)         128% 106% 95% 81% 
                  
Revenue/ Account 0.33 0.37 0.39 0.37 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.39 
                  
Skype-to-Skype Minutes (billions) 5.2 6.9 7.1 6.6 7.6 7.7 7.2 6.1 
(delta billions)   1.7 0.2 -0.5 1 0.1 -0.5 -1.1 
(Q/Q)   33% 3% -7% 15% 1% -6% -15% 
(Y/Y)         46% 12% 1% -8% 
                  
SkypeOut Minutes 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.4 
(delta billions)   0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0 -0.2 0.1 
(Q/Q)   40% 29% 22% 36% 0% -13% 8% 
(Y/Y)         200% 114% 44% 27% 
                  
Total Minutes 5.7 7.6 8 7.7 9.1 9.2 8.5 7.5 
(delta billions)   1.9 0.4 -0.3 1.4 0.1 -0.7 -1 
(Q/Q)   33% 5% -4% 18% 1% -8% -12% 
(Y/Y)         60% 21% 6% -3% 
Source: Compiled from eBay earnings release & conference calls, skypejournal.com, and 
sypenumerology.com 
 
Table 3. Selected Financial Performance and Usage Data for ITD Corp.’s Retail Calling Card Business  
(million; in USD except for 
minutes) 2004 2005 2006 2007
Revenues 1148.1 1220.4  1,194.9  936.7 
Direct Cost of Revenues 894.8 955  980.9  750.0 
Gross Profit  253.3 265.4  214.0  186.7 
Administrative Expenses 239.2 321  194.3  218.0 
Net Profit  14.1  (55.6)  19.7   (31.3)
Minutes of Use  15,627.0  17,224.0  16,005.0   11,217.0 
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Table 4. Skype-Related Pricing Information for Top, Median and Bottom 10 Countries Ranked by Annual 




































Phone to US 
in USD (most 
recent)
USA 1 0.0138 0.021 0.014 0.021 0.000
Mexico 2 0.0648 0.099 NA 0.336 0.045
Germany 3 0.0138 0.021 0.162 0.246 0.042
United Kingdom 4 0.0138 0.021 0.166 0.253 0.065
Italy 5 0.0138 0.021 0.203 0.308 0.067
Canada 6 0.0138 0.021 0.014 0.021 0.000
France 7 0.0138 0.021 0.133 0.203 0.068
China 8 0.0138 0.021 0.014 0.021 0.009
Japan 9 0.0154 0.023 0.101 0.154 0.024
Singapore 10 0.0203 0.021 0.020 0.021 0.009
Ghana 74 0.109 0.153 0.100 0.166 0.053
Senegal 75 0.154 0.234 0.172 0.261 0.069
Bahrain 76 0.160 0.243    0.018
Cyprus 77 0.039 0.059 0.067 0.074 0.034
Uruguay 78 0.083 0.126 0.168 0.255 0.048
Bulgaria 79 0.045 0.068 0.174 0.265 0.017
Qatar 80 0.247 0.376 0.249 0.378 0.000
Armenia 81 0.063 0.096 0.168 0.239 0.015
Nicaragua 82 0.142 0.216 0.148 0.225 0.016
Cuba 83 0.674 1.025    0.030
Chad 149 0.206 0.313  0.048
Comoros 150 0.262 0.398  0.046
Afghanistan 151 0.233 0.355  0.020
Montserrat 152 0.170 0.259  0.003
Burundi 153 0.101 0.154 0.093 0.142 0.023
Solomon Islands 154 0.758 1.153  0.030
Central Africa 155 0.129 0.196  0.070
Sao Tome and 
Principe 156 0.786 1.195  0.037
Rwanda 157 0.126 0.192  0.060
Kiribati 158 0.497 0.756  0.039
  
Average (All 
Countries) 0.074 0.110 0.130 0.202  0.031
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Table 5. Supplemental Information For Top, Median and Bottom 10 Countries Ranked by Annual 





International Voice traffic in 
Million Minutes (incoming 





Subscribers per 100 
USA 1 82,061.25 72.9 54.1 
Mexico 2 20,141.03 21.7 18.8 
Germany 3 15,683.00 51.7 65.3 
UK 4 15,600.00 65.9 55.2 
Italy 5 13,593.00 53.9 45.6 
Canada 6 13,499.57 84.9 64.3 
France 7 11,505.00 49.1 55.2 
China 8 9,729.91 15.9 27.7 
Japan 9 5,921.00 73.6 35.9 
Singapore 10 5,427.50 58.8 40.5 
Ghana 74 452.87 2.8 1.6
Senegal 75 409.00 6.6 2.2
Bahrain 76 408.16 33.2 26.3 
Cyprus 77 405.19 48.3 47.8 
Uruguay 78 400.00 29.2 29.1 
Bulgaria 79 396.34 52.3 30.1 
Qatar 80 393.04 42.0 28.4 
Armenia 81 385.76 5.7 19.7 
Nicaragua 82 355.11 2.8 4.5
Cuba 83 344.50 11.6 9.3
Chad 149 19.28 0.6 0.1
Comoros  150 18.68 3.4 3.1
Afghanistan 151 15.62 2.1 0.3
Montserrat 152 13.36 12.2 2.2
Burundi 153 10.68 0.7 0.4
Solomon Islands 154 9.65 1.7 1.5
Central Africa 155 8.90 0.3 0.3
Sao Tome 156 8.84 14.6 4.8
Rwanda 157 6.05 1.1 0.2
Kiribati 158 2.24 2.0 4.7
  
Average (All Countries) 3,978.15 32.2 20.4 
Source: World Development Indicators (Most recent data available as of 2007) 
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